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Abstract—Haze-assisted mobile health (mHealth)
monitoring,which applies the prevailing mobile
communications and Haze computing technologies to
provide feedback decision support, has been considered as
a revolutionary approach to improving the quality of
healthcare service while lowering the healthcare cost.
Unfortunately, it  also  poses  a  serious  risk  on  both
clients Confidentiality and intellectual property of
monitoring service providers, which could deter the wide
adoption of mHealth technology. This paper is to address
this important problem and design a Hazeassisted
Confidentiality Conserving mobile health monitoring
system to protect the Confidentiality of the involved
parties and their data. Moreover, the outsourcing
decryption technique and a newlyproposed key private
proxy re-encryption are adapted to shift the computational
complexity of the involved parties to the Haze without
compromising clients’ Confidentiality and service
providers’ intellectual property. Finally, our security and
performance analysis demonstrates the effectiveness of
our proposed design.
Index Terms—Mobile health (mHealth),
Healthcare,Confidentiality, Outsourcing decryption, Key
private proxy reencryption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wide deployment of mobile devices, such as  smart
phones equipped with low cost sensors, has already shown
great potential in improving the quality of healthcare
services. Remote mobile health monitoring has already
been recognized as not only a potential, but also a
successful example of mobile health (mHealth)
applications especially for developing countries. The
Microsoft launched project “MediNet” is designed to
realize remote monitoring on the health status of diabetes
and cardiovascular diseases in remote areas in Caribbean
countries [1]. In such a remote mHealth monitoring
system, a client could deploy portable sensors in wireless
body sensor networks to collect various physiological
data, such as blood pressure (BP), breathing rate (BR),
Electrocardiogram (ECG/EKG), peripheral oxygen
saturation (SpO2) and blood glucose. Such physiological
data could then be sent to a central server, which could
then run various web medical applications on these data to
return timely advice to the client. These applications may
have various functionalities ranging from sleep pattern
analyzers, exercises, physical activity assistants, to cardiac
analysis systems, providing various medical consultation
[2]. Moreover, as the emerging Haze computing
technologies evolve, a viable solution can be sought by
incorporating the software as a service (SaaS) model and
pay-as-you-go business model in Haze computing, which
would allow small companies (healthcare service
providers) to excel in this healthcare market. It has been
observed that the adoption of automated decision support
algorithms in the Haze-assisted mHealth monitoring has
been considered as a future trend [3].
Unfortunately, although Haze-assisted mHealth
monitoring could offer a great opportunity to improve the
quality of healthcare services and potentially reduce
healthcare costs, there is a stumbling block in making this
technology a reality. Without properly addressing the data
management in an mHealth system, clients’
Confidentiality may be severely breached during the
collection, storage, diagnosis, communications and
computing.
A recent study shows that 75% Americans consider the
Confidentiality of their health information important or
very important [4]. It has also been reported [5] that
patients’ willingness to get involved in health monitoring
program could be severely lowered when people are
concerned with the Confidentiality breach in their
voluntarily submitted health data. This Confidentiality
concern will be exacerbated due to the growing trend in
Confidentiality breaches on electronic  health data.
Although the existing Confidentiality laws such as
HIPAA ( Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act) provide baseline protection for personal health
record, they are generally considered not applicable or
transferable to Haze computing environments [6].
Besides, the current law is more focused on protection
against adversarial intrusions while there is little effort on
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protecting clients from business collecting private
information. Meanwhile, many companies have
significant commercial interests in collecting clients’
private health data [7] and sharing them with either
insurance companies, research institutions or even the
government agencies. It has also been indicated [8] that
Confidentiality law could not really exert any real
protection on clients’ data Confidentiality unless there is
an effective mechanism to enforce restrictions on the
activities of healthcare  service providers.
In this paper, we design a Haze-assisted mHealth
monitoring system (CAM). We first identify the design
problems on Confidentiality preservation and then
provide our solutions. To ease the understanding, we
start with the basic scheme so that we can identify the
possible Confidentiality breaches. We then provide an
improved scheme by addressing the identified
Confidentiality problems. The resulting improved
scheme allows the mHealth service provider (the
company) to be offline after the setup stage and
enables it to deliver its data or programs to the Haze
securely. To reduce clients’ decryption complexity, we
incorporate the recently proposed outsourcing
decryption technique [25] into the underlying
multidimensional range queries system to shift clients’
computational complexity to the Haze without
revealing any information on either clients’ query input
or the decrypted decision to the Haze. To relieve the
computational complexity on the company’s side,
which is proportional to the number of clients, we
propose a further improvement, leading to our final
scheme. It is based on a new variant of key private
proxy re-encryption scheme, in which the company
only needs to accomplish encryption once at the setup
phase while shifting the rest computational tasks to the
Haze without compromising Confidentiality, further
reducing the computational and communication burden
on clients and the Haze.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND
ADVERSARIAL MODEL
To facilitate our discussion, we first elaborate our
Hazeassisted mHealth monitoring system (CAM). CAM
consists of four parties: the Haze server (simply the Haze),
the company who provides the mHealth monitoring
service ( i.e., the healthcare service provider), the
individual clients ( simply clients), and a semi-trusted
authority (TA). The company stores its encrypted
monitoring data or program in the Haze server. Individual
clients collect their medical data and store them in their
mobile devices, which then transform the data into
attribute vectors. The attribute vectors are delivered as
inputs to the monitoring program in the Haze server
through a mobile (or smart) device. A semitrusted
authority is responsible for distributing private keys to the
individual clients and collecting the service fee from the
clients according to a certain business model such as pay-
as-you-go business model. The TA can be considered as a
collaborator or a management agent for a company (or
several companies) and thus shares certain level of mutual
interest with the company. However, the company and TA
could collude to obtain private health data from client
input vectors. We assume a neutral Haze server, which
means it neither colludes with the company nor a client to
attack the other side. This is a reasonable model since it
would be in the best business interest of the Haze not to be
biased. We admit that it remains possible for the Haze to
collude with other malicious entities in our CAM, and we
leave the CAM design under these stronger models as
future work. We also do not assume that an individual
client colludes with other clients. Our security model does
not consider the possible sidechannel attack [26], [27] due
to the coresidency on shared resources either because it
could be mitigated with either system level protection [27]
or leakage resilient cryptography [28]. CAM assumes an
honest but curious model, which implies all parties should
follow the prescribed actions and cannot be arbitrarily
malicious.
In the following, we briefly introduce the four major
steps of CAM: Setup, Store, TokenGen and Query. We
only illustrate the functionality of these components in
this section while leaving the details in later sections.
At the system initialization, TA runs the Setup phase
and publishes the system parameters. Then the company
first expresses the flow chart of the mHealth monitoring
program as a branching program (see Sec. III-B for
detail), which is encrypted under the respective directed
branching tree. Then the company delivers the resulting
ciphertext and its company index to the Haze, which
corresponds to the Store algorithm in the context.
When a client wishes to query the Haze for a certain
mHealth monitoring program, the i-th client and TA
run the TokenGen algorithm. The client sends the
company index to TA, and then inputs its private query
(which is the attribute vector representing the collected
health data) and TA inputs the master secret to the
algorithm. The client obtains the token corresponding
to its query input while TA gets no useful information
on the individual query.
During the last phase, the client delivers the token
for its query to the Haze, which runs the Query phase.
The Haze completes the major computationally
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intensive task for the client’s decryption and returns
the partially decrypted ciphertext to the client. The
client then completes the remaining decryption task
after receiving the partially decrypted ciphertext and
obtains its decryption result, which corresponds to the
decision from the monitoring program on the clients’
input. The Haze obtains no useful information on
either the client’s private query input or decryption
result after running the Query phase. Here, we
distinguish the query input Confidentiality breach in
terms of what can be inferred from the computational
or communication information. CAM can prevent the
Haze from deducing useful information from the
client’s query input or output corresponding to the
received information from the client. However, the
Haze might still be able to deduce side information on
the client’s private query input by observing the
client’s access pattern.  This issue could be resolved by
oblivious
RAM technique [29], but this is out of the scope of
Fig. 1. Branching program
this paper.
IV. CAM DESIGN
We are ready to present our design CAM:
HazeassistedConfidentiality Conserving mHealth
monitoring system. Toillustrate the fundamental idea
behind this design, we start with the basic scheme, and
then demonstrate how improvements can be made step-
by-step to meet our design goal. Some of the variables in
the following illustration may have already been defined
in the previous sections. The system time is divided into
multiple time periods, called slots, each of which can last
a week or a month depending on specific application
scenarios. There is an estimated maximum number of
users N requesting access to the monitoring program in
any given slot. When a client attempts to access the
program, it is assigned an index i [1,N] by TA.
A. Basic CAM
The following basic scheme runs the BF-IBE system as
a subroutine and is the fundamental building block in our
overall design.
Setup: This algorithm is performed by TA, which
publishes the system parameters for the BF-IBE  scheme.
Store: This algorithm is performed by the company.
For each node pj whose child nodes are not leaf nodes,
the company runs CL(j)=AnonEnc(id,PP,L(j))and
CR(j)= AnonEnc(id,PP,R(j))toencrypt the child node
indices under id with either id S[0,tj] or id
S[tj+1,Max], respectively. When the child nodes of pj
are leaf nodes, the company generates the ciphertext as
CL(j) = AnonEnc(id,PP,mL(j)) and CR(j) =
AnonEnc(id,PP,mR(j)), where mL(j)and mR(j)denote
the attached information at the two leafnodes,
respectively. All the generated ciphertexts are delivered
and stored in the Haze.
TokenGen: To generate the private key for the
attribute vector v=(v1,· · · ,vn), a client first computes
the identity representation set of each element in v and
delivers all the n identity representation sets to TA.
Then TA runs the AnonExtract(id,msk) on each
identity id Svi in the identity set and delivers all the
respective private keys skvi to the client.
Query: A client delivers the private key sets obtained
from the TokenGen algorithm to the Haze, which runs
the AnonDecryption algorithm on the ciphertext
generated in the Store algorithm. Starting from p1, the
decryption result determines which ciphertext should
be decrypted next. For instance, if v1 [0,t1], then the
decryption result indicates the next node index L(i).
The Haze will then use skv(L(i)) to decrypt the
subsequent ciphertext CL(i). Continue this process
iteratively until it reaches a leaf node and decrypt the
respective attached information.
B. CAM with Full Confidentiality Preservation
The basic scheme has the following security weakness:
first, the identity representation set for a client’s attribute
vector v is known to TA, and hence
TA can easily infer all the client’s private attribute vector.
Second, the client cannot protect his Confidentiality from
the Haze either because the Haze can easily find out the
identity representation for the private key skvi,i [1,n] by
running identity test in MDRQs. The Haze can simply
encrypt a random message under any attribute value v′
until when it can use skvi to successfully decrypt the
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ciphertext, which means there is a match between v′ = vi
and hence it successfully finds out vi. Third, neither can
the data Confidentiality of the company be guaranteed
since the identity representation of the respective range is
revealed to the Haze whenever the decryption is
successful due to the match revealing property (see Sec.
III-D) of MDRQs. The Haze can finally figure out most of
the company’s branching program since it has the
private keys of all  the
system users.
To rectify the weakness of the basic scheme, we
provide the following improvement. The high level idea
(as shown in Fig. 4) is as follows: in order to avoid
leaking the attribute vector to TA, the client obliviously
submits his attribute vectors to TA so that he can obtain
the respective private keys without letting TA get any
useful information on his private vector. The client runs
the outsourcing decryption of MDRQs to ensure the Haze
completes the major workload while obtaining no useful
information on his private keys. On the other hand, the
company will permute and randomize its data using
homomorphic encryption and MDRQs so that neither the
Haze nor a client can get any useful information on its
private information on branching program after a single
query.
Meanwhile, the company is also required to include the
randomness in the randomization step in the encryption
sent to TA to guarantee that TA can successfully generate
tokens for clients.
C. Final CAM with Full Confidentiality and High
Efficiency
Although the above improved scheme does meet the
desired security requirements, the company may need to
compute all the ciphertexts for  each of N clients, which
implies huge algorith
m and
computational overheads and may not be economically
feasible for small mHealth companies. In this section, we
provide a further improvement to reduce both the
computational burden on the company and the
communication overhead for the Haze. The high level
idea (as shown in Fig. 5) is as follows. We employ a
newly developed key private re-encryption scheme (
introduced in Sec. IV-C1) as an underlying tool. Instead
of computing a ciphertext for each client, the company
generates one single ciphertext, which will then be
delivered to the Haze. The company will then obliviously
deliver the identity threshold representation sets for the
thresholds of the decisional branching nodes and the
indexes of the concerned attributes to TA so that TA can
generate the ReKeys corresponding to the rest clients in
the system using the key private reencryption scheme. The
generated rekeys are then delivered to the Haze, which
can then run the reencryption scheme using the rekeys and
the single ciphertext delivered by the company to generate
the ciphertexts for the rest clients. The proposed
reencryption scheme incorporates the outsourcing
decryption so that the other security and efficiency
characteristics in the final CAM are inherited here.
Besides, the decryption algorithm of the proxy
reencryption scheme induces much less interactions
between clients and the Haze comparing with that in our
improved scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design a Haze-assisted Confidentiality
Conserving mobile health monitoring system, called
CAM, which can effectively protect the Confidentiality of
clients and the intellectual proerty of mHealth service
providers. To protect the clients’ Confidentiality, we
apply the anonymous BonehFranklin identitybased
encryption (IBE) in medical diagnostic branching
programs. To reduce the decryption complexity due to the
use of IBE, we apply recently proposed decryption
outsourcing with Confidentiality protection to shift
clients’ pairing computation to the Haze server. To protect
mHeath service providers’ programs, we expand the
branching program tree by using the random permutation
and randomize the decision thresholds used at the decision
branching nodes. Finally, to enable resourceconstrained
small companies to participate in mHealth business, our
CAM design helps them to shift the computational burden
to the Haze by applying newly developed key private
proxy re-encryption technique. Our CAM has been shown
to achieve the design objective.
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